This article offers reflections on the development of the Rubin causal model (RCM), which were stimulated by the impressive discussions of the RCM and Campbell's superb contributions to the practical problems of drawing causal inferences written by Will Shadish (2010) and Steve West and Felix Thoemmes (2010) . It is not a rejoinder in any real sense but more of a sequence of clarifications of parts of the RCM combined with some possibly interesting personal historical comments, which I do not think can be found elsewhere. Of particular interest in the technical content, I think, are the extended discussions of the stable unit treatment value assumption, the explication of the variety of definitions of causal estimands, and the discussion of the assignment mechanism.
I thank the journal's editor, Scott Maxwell, for the opportunity to discuss these very thoughtful, well-written, and scholarly articles (Shadish, 2010; West & Thoemmes, 2010) comparing Don Campbell's perspective on causal inference and my framework, sometimes referred to as the Rubin causal model (RCM; Holland, 1986 ) for a sequence of articles written in the 1970s (Rubin, 1974 (Rubin, , 1975 (Rubin, , 1976 (Rubin, , 1977 (Rubin, , 1978 (Rubin, , 1979 (Rubin, , 1980 . I agree with essentially all of the points made by Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) . However, to go point by point would make for very dull and laborious writing and reading-I tried! I wrote, edited, and discarded many versions of this discussion before settling on the current version, which also benefits from careful readings and helpful comments from Shadish, West and Thoemmes, the editor, and an anonymous reviewer.
This version includes some more personal comments and some previously unwritten history that I hope will interest readers. As suggested by my title, this article consists of reflections and clarifications stimulated by the comments of Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) , rather than a direct discussion of their contributions. First, I begin with some general brief comments on the compatibility of Campbell's and my perspectives on causal inference. Second, I offer some historical comments regarding my introduction to Campbell and my earlier introduction to his work through my doctoral advisor at Harvard University, the renowned statistician William (Bill) G. Cochran. Third, I give a cursory summary of the early evolution of the RCM's use of potential outcomes, and I give a further explication of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and describe how it drives the distinction between causal and descriptive statements; more discussion of SUTVA is desired, as Shadish as well as West and Thoemmes suggested, and I provide some here. Fourth, I offer a description of the variety of definitions of causal effects allowed in the RCM, a point sometimes missed. Fifth, I offer some historical comments involving Cochran and Jerzy Neyman and the nonuse of potential outcomes to define causal effects outside of randomized experiments until Rubin (1974) . Sixth, I summarize the definition of the assignment mechanism and indicate how it leads naturally to extensions of classical randomization-based methods of inference, including to propensity score methods (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983b) . I then very briefly discuss model-based (Bayesian) posterior predictive causal inference as proposed in Rubin (1975 Rubin ( , 1978 . I conclude with some comments on how the discussions by Shadish and by West and Thoemmes have generated an even greater respect for Campbell's contributions to causal inference.
Complementary Perspectives
Shadish and West and Thoemmes are far more capable than I am at summarizing Campbell's contributions, but I agree that Campbell's focus was on threats to validity and practical advice for avoiding or compensating for them through creative study designs. I believe that many of these threats can be summarized by the simple statement they lead to nonignorable treatment assignment (Rubin, 1978) or ignorable but still confounded treatment assignment mechanisms (Rubin, 1990b) , both of which are formal mathematical concepts within the RCM, whose definitions are provided later in this article. Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) are certainly correct that my focus was on finding the precise mathematical assumptions under which various designs and analyses led to valid estimation of causal effects, especially in the face of real-world complications, such as unplanned missing data or noncompliance with assigned treatment. By valid estimation, I mean assertions having the statistical properties claimed for them, not necessarily unbiased point estimation in Neyman's technical sense (described here subsequently).
Of course, having precise mathematical concepts without accompanying advice about their real-world propriety or advice for ways to make the mathematical assumptions more plausible is not all that helpful in practice, and this is exactly why Campbell's and my perspectives are, in broad generality, complementary and not competitive. I tried to give advice in my technical academic articles in the 1970s, but it was impossible at that stage in my career to have as much wisdom as the much more experienced Campbell (I hope and think that I have done much better in this regard in my real-world consulting work and more recently in my publications). The advantage of the mathematical formalism is that it is context free and so generalizes across all fields. However, focusing only on the formalism has the undeniable limitation of making it essentially impossible to give sage and general contextfree advice. Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) are clearly correct in stating that Campbell provided far more advice on topics such as construct validity than I did-I was virtually silent on that topic in my earlier statistical publications, except to some extent through my discussions of SUTVA, as I briefly address later here, and in my more recent work on noncompliance (e.g., Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Mealli & Rubin, 2002a) and, more generally, on problems related to principal stratification (Frangakis & Rubin, 2002) . For example, my work on censoring due to death is relevant to this issue and discussed abstractly in Rubin (2006a) and in the job-training context in Mealli (2008, 2009) . Even more relevant to education and psychology are Mealli and Rubin (2002b) and Jin and Rubin (2009) . Some might even consider that my early willingness and eagerness to confront causal inference in observational studies and to consider the associated sensitivity of inference to assumptions, as in Rubin (1973a Rubin ( , 1973b or Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) , revealed a deep concern with aspects of construct validity and a desire to provide guidance and advice for how to think about these assumptions.
My Introduction to Don Campbell

His Work
My memory of my first introduction to Don Campbell's work on causality was through Bill Cochran in the late 1960s. Cochran not only referred to Campbell and Stanley (1966) in his class on observational studies, but he also seemed to know Campbell fairly well personally. He clearly greatly admired Campbell's common sense and his tremendous practical contributions. He did, however, alert me that when Campbell tried to do more "mathy" sorts of things, he could, at times, be off target in Cochran's view. Campbell (1988, e.g., p. 20) , in an autobiographical chapter, commented on his own mathematical limitations.
The Man Himself
I personally met Campbell only a few times, all after I was employed at the Educational Testing Services in Princeton, New Jersey. We first met sometime around 1971 or 1972 when I was involved in an observational study of some educational intervention on which Campbell was an advisor; Cook (2008) and Campbell (1988) offer much more complete historical pictures of Campbell's work at this time than I can. Because my doctoral thesis was on matched sampling in observational studies under Cochran, I thought that I understood the general context fairly well, and so I was asked by the Educational Testing Service to visit Campbell at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, which is, incidentally, where I grew up. I remember sitting in his office with, I believe, one or two current students or perhaps junior faculty. The topic of matching arose, and my memory is that Campbell referred to it as "sin itself" because of "regression to the mean issues" when matching on fallible test scores rather than "true" scores. I was flabbergasted! However, I recently realized that I misunderstood the context for Campbell's comment, which is accurately expressed in Campbell and Erlebacher (1970) .
Subsequently, I had repeated disagreements with a variety of people about the following point: If treatment assignments are based on a fallible test score, I argued, then matching on the fallible scores, not matching on the hypothetical true scores, is the correct thing to do even if the true scores are available for matching. At that time, not everyone seemed convinced, so I finally wrote what I thought was a quite obvious article (Rubin, 1977) showing this formally. This article generalized previous more specific results of David Cox, Art Goldberger, and others cited in that article, which treated the regression discontinuity design (Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960) as a special case of assignment to treatment group on the basis of a covariate (Rubin, 1977) . Of course, the situation with an unobserved covariate used for treatment assignment is far more complex, and that situation, coupled with the naïve view that matching can fix all problems with nonrandomized studies, appears to have been the context for Campbell's comment on matching.
Campbell and I met a couple more times at various advisory committees we both attended; all were cordial meetings. My lasting impression of Campbell was that of a very smart and sharp intellectual but also a true gentleman, with an intense interest in addressing real problems with wisdom-very much like Cochran himself but with less technical/mathematical knowledge and more exposure to the intricate problems that arise when doing research on possible interventions with human subjects, especially in psychology and education but also in medicine.
The Early Evolution of the RCM
My introduction to formal causal inference was Cochran's course, Classical Experimental Design, Statistics 140, at Harvard, which I took in the spring of 1969. This was an extremely fortunate occurrence for me in that I learned the importance of clear thinking about causal inference in the context of the design of randomized experiments, rather than in the generally confused context of regression models, or path analyses, or various pictures, which even then appeared to be the standard approaches to the analysis of nonrandomized/observational data for causal effects. In classical experimental design, there was a clear separation between the object of inference-which I now like to call the science-and what researchers do to learn about the science-randomly assign treatments to units.
Perhaps because of my physics background, it seemed to me to make no sense to discuss statistical methods and estimators without first having a clear concept of what one is attempting to estimate, which, I agree with Shadish (2010) , was a limitation of Campbell's framework.
1 Nevertheless, Campbell is not alone when implicitly, rather than explicitly, defining what he was trying to estimate. A nontrivial amount of statistical discussion (confused and confusing to me) eschews the explicit definition of estimands; see, for example, Holland and Rubin (1983) on the previous literature concerning Lord's paradox, Rubin (1994) and the issue of definitional bias (Efron, 1994) , and Rubin (2004 Rubin ( , 2005 on direct and indirect causal effects. My attitude is that it is critical to define quantities carefully before trying to estimate them. A specific example of this attitude is the discussion by Mealli and Rubin (2003) of what we considered to be a confused description of direct and indirect causal effects attacked by regression models based on implausible underlying assumptions.
The Science
In the context of causal inference, the science is a matrix where the rows represent N units, which are physical objects at a particular point in time (e.g., students today), and the columns represent covariates and potential outcomes. The units could be the same physical object at different points in time, different physical objects at the same point in time, or a mixture of both.
Consider the simple case with one covariate, X (e.g., pretest score), which cannot be affected by which of two treatments (e.g., a new educational program and a standard educational program) each unit receives, and one outcome Y (e.g., posttest score), which can be affected by which treatment each unit receives. Each row of the science, indexed by i ϭ 1, . . . , N, is written as 
where X, Y(1), and Y(0) are all N-component column vectors. The generalization to multicomponent X and Y and to more than two treatments is conceptually obvious.
SUTVA
This representation of the science is adequate under SUTVA (Rubin, 1980) : For a specific unit, say i, and the treatment that unit i receives, W i , SUTVA asserts that the value of Y i (W i ) is stable (i.e., determined). SUTVA rules out hidden versions of treatments (i.e., there are no unrepresented treatments) as well as interference between units, that is, unit i's value of Y i (W i ) cannot be affected by the treatments the other units receive. Both aspects of SUTVA deserve some more commentary.
In the interest of clarity, I use an example that I have used since 1974. Consider a study of the effectiveness of aspirin versus placebo on the intensity of headache pain in 2 hours. With only one unit, if there is only one aspirin tablet and only one placebo tablet available, then there are no hidden versions of treatments. If there are two aspirin tablets available for that unit (one is strong and the other weak) and the science represents only two treatments, aspirin and placebo, then there is a hidden treatment: Y(aspirin) is not stable because it depends on which aspirin tablet is chosen. If I specified that I randomly chose one of the two aspirin tablets, then the value is stable, although it then has a probability distribution. However, if I do not specify how I select the aspirin tablet, SUTVA is generally violated unless the science is represented by three treatments. I use generally in the previous sentence because if Y simply were an indicator for some reduction in headache pain, then arguably both the weak and strong aspirin tablets would result in some reduction, thereby allowing SUTVA to be satisfied for this Y.
The no interference aspect of SUTVA is more obvious in that it simply states that, in this example of a study of aspirin tablets, my potential outcomes cannot be affected by which tablets the other units receive. Moreover, SUTVA need hold only for the values of
T being contemplated in the real or hypothetical study.
2 For example, perhaps only 5% of the units will be assigned to the new treatment, a special on-site job-training program, and the rest will be assigned to a control program consisting of only at-home reading materials; this might be done to avoid the interference between units that could occur from flooding local markets with better trained individuals. Then, in this example, SUTVA need hold only for vectors W such that
The definition of SUTVA forces the distinction between causal statements and descriptive statements, as I argued in Rubin (1986) , which expanded on the same argument in Rubin (1975, p. 234) . For example, is the statement "She did well on that literature test because she is a girl" causal or merely descriptive? If W ϭ 0 means that this unit remains a girl and W ϭ 1 means that this unit is "converted" to a boy, the factual Y(0) is well defined and observed, but the counterfactual Y(1) appears to be hopelessly ill-defined and therefore unstable. Does the hypothetical "converted to a boy" mean an at-birth sex-change operation, or does it mean massive hormone injections at puberty, or does it mean cross-dressing from 2 years of age, and so forth? Only if all such contemplated hypothetical interventions can be argued to have the same hypothetical Y(1) will the requirement of SUTVA that there be no hidden versions of treatments be appropriate for this unit. If not, either each possible intervention for effecting a female-to-male conversion must be explicated and represented by a different W 1 I entered Princeton University in 1961 in a program designed by the physicist John Wheeler, a Nobel laureate commonly credited with inventing the term black hole, to get a few of us PhDs in physics 5 years after entering as freshman-to the best of my knowledge, no one succeeded.
2 More generally, each of the N units can be exposed to one of K treatments as indicated by W i , i ϭ 1, . . . , N, where each W i can take values in the set ᐃ. Thus, the vector W ϭ (W 1 , . . . , W N )
T takes values in a set ᐃ ‫ء‬ , which is a subset of the product set ᐃ K . In our current example, W ϭ (0, 1), with a corresponding different Y(W) to avoid hidden versions of treatments (and a consequential violation of SUTVA) or the specific hypothetical intervention to convert her to a boy must be described with enough detail to convince us that Y(1) would be stable. Notice that SUTVA could hold for some outcome variables but not for others, as mentioned earlier in the context of the aspirin example.
An example of a legitimate causal statement involving an immutable characteristic, such as gender or race, occurs when the unit is a résumé of a job applicant sent to a prospective employer, and the treatments are the names attached to the resume, either an obviously Anglo Saxon name (W ϭ 0) or an obviously African American name (W ϭ 1), where Y is an indicator of an invitation to apply for the job after receipt of the résumé (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004) .
Definitions of Unit-Level Causal Effects and Population-Level Causal Effects
The causal effect of Treatment 1 versus Treatment 0 for the ith unit is a comparison of the corresponding potential outcomes for that unit: Y i (1) versus Y i (0) (e.g., their difference or their ratio). The "fundamental problem facing inference for causal effects" (Rubin, 1978, p. 38 ) is that only one of the potential outcomes can ever be observed for each unit, the one corresponding to the actual assignment. Therefore, unit-level causal effects must be inferred and can never be exactly known. After the assignment of treatments, only one of a unit's potential outcomes can be observedthe rest are missing.
However, this missingness in the potential outcomes does not mean that unit-level causal effects cannot be validly estimated unless assumed constant, as sometimes is asserted. Unit-level causal effects can be predicted, although in general not perfectly, with the help of covariates, as developed in Rubin (1978) from the Bayesian perspective (discussed briefly later). These effects can, in randomized experiments, be unbiasedly estimated from Neyman's (1923 Neyman's ( /1990 ) perspective (discussed briefly later), if one includes the random sampling of the unit (for which an unbiased estimate is desired) from all those units with the same value of X as part of the expectation operator for calculating bias. Of course, estimation of unit-level causal effects from either the Bayesian or Neymanian perspective is generally imprecise relative to the estimation of population or subpopulation causal effects because predictions of summaries are usually more precise than individual predictions. (Frangakis & Rubin, 2002) because it uses the potential outcomes themselves to define a stratum of units where the causal effect is desired; principal stratification is a substantial generalization of the idea underlying instrumental variables, as discussed, for example, in Angrist et al. (1996) .
Although average causal effects are common estimands in much of social science, it is also common that the causal estimands are not summaries of individual unit-level causal effects in some fields, for instance, in epidemiology. For example, the units are people in a specific region of a country, where W i ϭ 1 indicates that unit i is vaccinated for influenza, and W i ϭ 0 indicates that unit i is not vaccinated. The binary outcome Y i indicates whether unit i got influenza within 1 month after the choice to vaccinate or not. The risk ratio in the entire population of not vaccinating everyone to vaccinating everyone is the disease rate under W i ϭ 0 divided by the disease rate under W i ϭ 1:
In this example, SUTVA must be carefully considered; if every unit gets vaccinated except Unit 1, its chance for getting the flu may be lower than if no unit got vaccinated. Some causal estimands even involve the treatment assignment indicator. For example, in some settings, and this is especially common when creating matched samples (e.g., Rubin, 2006b) , one may want to estimate the effect of treatment versus control on those units who received treatment. Two prominent examples come to mind. The first involves the effect on earnings of serving in the military when drafted following a lottery and the attendant issue of whether society should compensate those who served for possible lost wages (Angrist, 1990) . The second example involves the effect on health care costs of smoking cigarettes for those who chose to smoke because of misconduct of the tobacco industry (Rubin, 2000) .
The reason for providing these different examples of definitions of causal effects is to emphasize that there is no reason to focus solely on the average causal effect, although this quantity is especially easy to estimate unbiasedly with standard statistical tools in randomized experiments under simple assumptions. This generality of possible causal estimands was always present in the RCM framework, as stated in Rubin (1974, p. 690) . Also, there is no need to assume anything about the constancy of unit-level causal effects, although, once again, this assumption simplifies estimation.
Neyman (1923), Cochran (1965), and Neyman a Half Century Later
The potential outcome notation, originally due to Neyman in 1923 (see Neyman, 1923 Neyman, /1990 ; the introduction to that article by Speed, 1990 ; and the discussion by Rubin, 1990a) , in the context of randomized experiments and randomization-based inference was extremely important and clarifying, and it dominated formal statistical discussions in the context of randomized experiments (e.g., see the classic text by Kempthorne, 1952 , and the earlier and later references cited in Rubin, 1990a) .
Although I learned about that notation in Cochran's Statistics 140 (not knowing about the then recondite source, Neyman, 1923 Neyman, / 1990 , that notation was entirely limited to inference about average causal effects in randomized experiments; for example, Cochran's course on observational studies never mentioned the potential outcomes notation and instead used the observed outcomes notation described next. I know of no reference that used the potentialoutcomes notation in discussions of causal inference outside this restricted context until I did so in Rubin (1974) . Even in 1970, I found the lack of use of this marvelous notation in nonrandomized studies most surprising.
Everyone, including my statistical heroes, such as Cochran, could simultaneously use the potential-outcomes notation when discussing randomized experiments and the inadequate observed outcomes notation when discussing causal inference in nonrandomized studies. The observed outcome notation replaces Y i (1) and Y i (0) with the observed value, (0), and what one does to learn about the science, the W i . With this notation, it even becomes impossible to state formally the major benefit of randomization (as I discuss later). For a specific example, Cochran's (1965) paper on observational studies, read at the Royal Statistical Society, used this observed outcome notation, as did (I believe) all the papers that he cited (e.g., written by famous authors, such as Doll, Dorn, Hill, etc.), with W i used as an indicator (in regressions) for treatment received.
I vaguely remember asking Cochran about this use of the observed outcome notation when we were writing Cochran and Rubin (1973) in 1971, and his reply was to the effect that everyone did observational studies that way, and he never thought of trying to use the potential-outcomes notation in a nonrandomized study. In fact, the last section of Cochran (1965) is entitled "The Step From Association to Causation," and it is very Campbellesquefull of sage advice but all words. Associations were all that could really be formally estimated in a nonrandomized study, so the advice was to examine associations among observed variables and to make informed, wise assessments concerning which of the observed associations might reflect a causal mechanism.
Furthermore, when I was visiting the Department of Statistics at the University of California, Berkeley, in the mid-1970s, where Neyman was professor emeritus, I asked him why no one ever used the potential-outcomes notation from randomized experiments to define causal effects more generally, noting that my article, Rubin (1974) , was (by my reading) the first to do so. I did not know then that Neyman invented the notation, and I did not find that out until 1989, when I was asked to write a discussion (Rubin, 1990a) of the previously unpublished, at least in English, Neyman (1923 Neyman ( /1990 . Nevertheless, in Rubin (1990b Rubin ( , written in 1987 , I attributed the use of Neyman's mode of inference in randomized experiments using that notation to Neyman (1934) , which concerned the analogous unbiased estimation and repeated sampling inference in sample surveys.
3 Somewhat remarkably in hindsight, at this meeting in the mid 1970s, Neyman never mentioned that he invented the notation, and his reply to my question about why it was not used outside experiments was to the effect that defining causal effects in nonrandomized settings was too speculative and that in such settings, statisticians should stick with statements concerning descriptions and associations. Neyman is even quoted in his biography by Reid (1982) as saying "without randomization an experiment has little value irrespective of the subsequent treatment" (p. 45). Cochran was a bit more lenient toward the use of observational studies to try to infer causality, as he admitted to me, saying something like, "That's why the consumers of statistics, such as doctors, ask us to analyze their observational data."
The Assignment Mechanism
In contrast to Neyman's conservative attitude toward causal inference outside randomized experiments, an attitude that was totally dominant in the field of statistics at the time, as was Berkeley's version of mathematical statistics, I saw randomization as just one way to create missing and observed data in the potential outcomes. There are many other processes for creating missing data, as I called them in Rubin (1976, p. 581) , that could be used, which were called assignment mechanisms in Rubin (1978) in the context of causal inference.
Definition of the Assignment Mechanism
The assignment mechanism gives the probability of each vector of assignments, W, given the science
Before Rubin (1975) , there were written descriptions of assignment mechanisms, such as (obviously) randomized ones and nonrandomized ones (e.g., Roy, 1951) , but to the best of my knowledge, there was no formal mathematical statement or notation showing the possible dependence of treatment assignments on the potential outcomes. I regard the formal statement of the assignment mechanism as an important contribution and as not at all obvious except from a formal missing data perspective. It states that the probability of something that one does now, that is, selects the treatment assignment vector, W, can depend not only on things observed now, X, and Y obs in a sequential experiment but can depend moreover on other things that will never even be realized, Y mis . Yet, as a formal probability statement, it is mathematically coherent, and I believe it is the key to a clear conceptual understanding of the benefit of randomization.
The crucial bridge to understanding the assignment mechanism's possible dependence on values of the potential outcomes is to think of unobserved-to the analyst of the data-covariates, U, that are associated with the future potential outcomes and are used by the assigner of treatments, hypothetical or real, in addition to X. Thus, the assigner of treatments uses X and U to make decisions in some possibly stochastic way, but given X and U, the assigner does not use Y(1) or Y(0), so that
However, when this expression is averaged over the values of U for fixed values of X, Y(1), Y(0) to calculate the assignment mechanism, the result yields dependence on Y(1), Y(0). For example, suppose that W i ϭ 0 indicates a standard educational treatment and W i ϭ 1 indicates a new educational treatment. In addition, U is the teacher's assessment of the students' future performances under the standard treatment, and U is used in addition to X (observed test scores) to assign students to the new versus standard treatment. Then, depending on the accuracy of the teacher's assessments, U is very predictive of Y(0), and the assignment mechanism then depends on X and Y(0). The assignment mechanism is unconfounded (with the potential outcomes; Rubin, 1990b) if
That is, the assignment mechanism is unconfounded if treatment assignments are (stochastically) determined by observed covariates. An unconfounded assignment mechanism is probabilistic if all the unit-level probabilities, the propensity scores (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983b ),
are between 0 and 1,
so that all units have a chance of receiving each of the treatments. An unconfounded probabilistic assignment mechanism is called strongly ignorable in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b) , a stronger version of an ignorable assignment mechanism (Rubin, 1978) , defined by
which is especially important for Bayesian inference, because everything on the right side of the equal sign is observed (ignoring issues such as sampling units from a population and unintended missing data). Ignorable but confounded assignment mechanisms arise in sequential experiments, for example, when the apparently more successful treatment, based on results from earlier units, is assigned with higher probability to future units. Classical randomized experiments are special cases of strongly ignorable assignment mechanisms (similar to regular designs in Imbens & Rubin, 2010 ) that often have symmetries and multiple treatments, such as a 2 ϫ 2 factorial with the same number of units in each of the four treatment conditions. To return to an earlier point, one cannot even use the observed outcome notation to formally state the unconfoundedness benefit of randomized experiments. If one tries to use Y obs ϭ (Y obs,1 , . . . , Y obs,N ) T to do so and one writes,
one is asserting that the new versus control treatment does not affect Y, that is, Y i (1) ϭ Y i (0) for all i. To repeat, using the observed outcome notation entangles the science, Y i (1), Y i (0), X i , and the assignments, W i -bad! Yet, the reduction to the observed outcome notation is exactly what regression approaches, path analyses, directed acyclic graphs, and so forth essentially compel one to do. For an example of the confusion that regression approaches create, see Holland and Rubin (1983) on Lord's paradox or the discussion by Mealli and Rubin (2003) 
Distinguish Between the Science and the Assignment Mechanism
Using the potential-outcomes notation in the RCM maintains the critical distinctions between what one is trying to estimate-the science-and what one does to learn about the science-the assignment mechanism-whether the latter is actually randomized, hypothetically randomized, self-selection, or so forth. It is no surprise that magnificent statisticians who eschewed the potentialoutcomes notation in observational studies, or even in randomized experiments, got wrong answers in relatively complicated situations-even the great R. A. Fisher was not immune when discussing direct and indirect effects in randomized experiments (Rubin, 2005) ! Because this distinction (between the science and the assignment mechanism) is maintained in the RCM, extensions of classical methods of inference in randomized experiments, due to Fisher (1925) and Neyman (1923 Neyman ( /1990 , are natural within the RCM framework. These methods and the extensions beyond classical randomized experiments are now briefly discussed. The text by Imbens and Rubin (2010) has several chapters on such extensions.
Causal Inference Based Solely on the Assignment Mechanism
Both Fisher and Neyman proposed methods of causal inference based solely on the randomization distribution of statistics induced by a classical randomized assignment mechanism, and both of these could be extended to strongly ignorable, or even to some nonignorable assignment mechanisms, in what I regard as fairly natural ways.
Fisher's Exact p Values for Sharp Null Hypotheses
Fisher's method was essentially a stochastic proof by contradiction. First, assume what one wants to prove is wrong. Here, that means assuming that the new and control treatments are identical:
Under this assumption, there are no missing values in the science for the units in this experiment; thus, the value of every statistic, such as the difference in the mean Y i (1) for those assigned W i ϭ 1, y 1 , and the mean Y i (0) for those assigned W i ϭ 0, y 0 , is known, not only for the observed W but for all possible Ws. The Fisher proposal is to locate y 1 Ϫ y 0 in the distribution of possible y 1 Ϫ y 0 under the randomized assignment mechanism and to see how extreme the observed value is relative to the possible values. The proportion as extreme or more extreme gives the significance level (or p value) associated with H 0 as assessed for the observed data by the statistic y 1 Ϫ y 0 and the definition of extremeness.
Extensions of Fisher's Method
Notice, however, that Fisher's method can be applied with any sharp null hypothesis, for example, Rubin, 1974, p. 694) and even with nonignorable assignment mechanisms if they are fully specified in their dependence on the potential outcomes, because all potential outcomes are known and, thus, so are all possible values of all statistics for all assignment vectors, W, as are all probabilities of each assignment. Instead of simply counting the proportion of possible statistics that are as extreme or more extreme than the observed statistic, however, now one must take a weighted proportion, where the weights reflect the probability of each vector of treatment assignments. Bayesian extensions of this method were proposed in Rubin (1984) and further extended by others (e.g., Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996) , and they are called posterior predictive p values. Neyman (1923 Neyman ( /1990 showed that, in a completely randomized experiment, y 1 Ϫ y 0 is unbiased (averaging over all randomizations) for the average causal effect, and he showed that the usual estimate of the standard error of (y 1 Ϫ y 0 ) is conservative unless additivity holds, that is, unless
Neyman's Randomization-Based Estimates and Confidence Intervals
These results led Neyman to propose a large-sample interval estimate for the average causal effect, which he later called a confidence interval (Neyman, 1934) . He defined the confidence interval as having at least its nominal coverage, to reflect, I believe, the generally conservative asymptotic estimation of the standard error in experiments.
Neyman's approach, despite its asymptotic nature, became the standard one in much of statistics and applied fields, leading to such things as tables of expected mean squares in analyses of variance (e.g., see Green & Tukey, 1960 ). Neyman's approach, which essentially involved repeated sampling evaluations of the operating characteristics of statistics, has advantages over Fisher's in that it can deal with random sampling of units from a population and with alternative hypotheses that were not sharp null hypothesis, which Fisher's approach required. This latter difference led to a sharp attack by Fisher (1935) on Neyman at a Royal Statistical Society meeting (Neyman, 1935) even though Neyman's presentation was complimentary about Fisher's contributions. Fisher's approach has the obvious advantage over Neyman's in not requiring large samples for the exactness of its probabilistic statements.
Extensions of Neyman's Approach
Neyman's approach works in the sense that the bias of various statistics and the coverage of various interval estimates can be evaluated, even for nonignorable assignment mechanisms. However, one can rarely derive exactly unbiased estimates. For example, the standard instrumental variables estimate generally has infinite bias for all finite samples. In addition, one can rarely derive asymptotically useful interval estimates. For example, randomly choosing the interval (Ϫϱ, ϱ) 95% of the time and randomly choosing any point the other 5% of the time is an exact 95% confidence interval for all sample sizes and all data sets, but it is not very useful! Nevertheless, the essential idea behind Neyman's approach, repeated sampling evaluations, today remains the basis for much statistical work; for example, it still dominates sample survey practice. In fact, much of the theory behind propensity score methods, which are really generalizations of Neyman's approach, rests on the fact that an unconfounded probabilistic assignment mechanism very generally can be written as proportional to the product of the propensity scores for all W that have positive probability.
A Final Comment on Fisher's and Neyman's Methods
Notice that a key feature of both Fisher's and Neyman's approaches is that the science is treated as fixed but unknown, and yet it is the object of inference. In addition, the vector of treatment assignments, W, is the only random variable (except for a sampling indicator, which can be incorporated in Neyman's approach). Also, realize that the concepts created by these methods-p values, significance levels, unbiased estimation, confidence coverage (all defined originally by averaging over the randomization distribution)-remain fundamental today. These fundamental ideas with the science fixed cannot be clearly represented by graphs or paths, which are effectively wedded to the observed outcome notation, and these other approaches do not create a clear distinction between the science and the assignment mechanism; for example, see Rubin (2004) , the discussion by Lauritzen (2004) , the rejoinder, and the previously mentioned exchange of letters in Statistics in Medicine (Rubin, 2009) . To borrow Campbell's expression, I believe that the greatest threat to the validity of causal inference is ignoring the distinction between the science and what one does to learn about the science, the assignment mechanism-a fundamental lesson learned from classical experimental design but often forgotten. My reading of Campbell's work on causal inference indicates that he was keenly aware of this distinction.
Formal Limitations of the RCM Without Its Bayesian Component
In a formal sense, however, Fisher's and Neyman's approaches rarely addressed the real reasons researchers conduct studies-to learn about which interventions should be applied to future units, for example, which educational programs are most likely to succeed next year. Fisher's p values for sharp null hypothesis formally work only for the units actually exposed to one treatment or the other, and they leave generalizations informal. Neyman's approach works only for populations from which the units in the study have been sampled in some probabilistic way, and researchers never are fortunate enough to have a sample of units from the future. Thus, given any real study, even a perfect randomized experiment, in order to inform future decisions, researchers must rely on subjective judgments as I argued in Rubin (1974) , and making such subjective judgments rest on a more formal basis is important, I believe.
Thus, to me, the third leg of the RCM, which derives the Bayesian posterior predictive distribution of the missing potential outcomes, although optional, is critical. That is, the first leg is using potential outcomes to define causal effects no matter how one tries to learn about them: First, define the science. The second leg is to describe the process by which some potential outcomes will be revealed: Second, posit an assignment mechanism. The third leg is placing a probability distribution on the science to allow formal probability statements about the causal effects, not only in the past but also in the future: Third, incorporate scientific understanding in a model for the science. That is, the Bayesian approach directs researchers to condition on all observed quantities and to predict in a stochastic way the missing potential outcomes of all units, past and future. Thereby, researchers make informed decisions, based on explicitly stated assumptions, about which interventions look most promising for future application.
Final Comments
In conclusion, reading Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) helped me to appreciate, much more than before, the vast contributions made by Campbell and his associates to many practical aspects of causal inference and how these contributions complement my work and that of my associates. Campbell's contributions focused on real-life problems from a deep but commonsense perspective that led to clear guidance for causal inference. I hope that my reflections and clarifications concerning the RCM and the few historical comments that I have noted about the evolution of the RCM, in combination with the target articles by Shadish and by West and Thoemmes, and the other discussions of these articles in this issue, create an interesting and informative package for the readers of Psychological Methods.
